Conditions under which Arousal Does and Does Not Elevate Height Estimates by Storbeck, Justin & Stefanucci, Jeanine K.
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research Queens College 
2014 
Conditions under which Arousal Does and Does Not Elevate 
Height Estimates 
Justin Storbeck 
CUNY Queens College 
Jeanine K. Stefanucci 
University of Utah 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/qc_pubs/37 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
Conditions under which Arousal Does and Does Not
Elevate Height Estimates
Justin Storbeck1*, Jeanine K. Stefanucci2
1 Department of Psychology, Queens College, City University of New York, Flushing, New York, United States of America, 2 Department of Psychology, University of Utah,
Salt Lake City, Utah, United States of America
Abstract
We present a series of experiments that explore the boundary conditions for how emotional arousal influences height
estimates. Four experiments are presented, which investigated the influence of context, situation-relevance, intensity, and
attribution of arousal on height estimates. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the environmental context to signal either
danger (viewing a height from above) or safety (viewing a height from below). High arousal only increased height estimates
made from above. In Experiment 2, two arousal inductions were used that contained either 1) height-relevant arousing
images or 2) height-irrelevant arousing images. Regardless of theme, arousal increased height estimates compared to a
neutral group. In Experiment 3, arousal intensity was manipulated by inserting an intermediate or long delay between the
induction and height estimates. A brief, but not a long, delay from the arousal induction served to increase height
estimates. In Experiment 4, an attribution manipulation was included, and those participants who were made aware of the
source of their arousal reduced their height estimates compared to participants who received no attribution instructions.
Thus, arousal that is attributed to its true source is discounted from feelings elicited by the height, thereby reducing height
estimates. Overall, we suggest that misattributed, embodied arousal is used as a cue when estimating heights from above
that can lead to overestimation.
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Introduction
A growing body of work suggests that emotions influence
perceptual judgments. For example, threatening objects may
appear closer than neutral objects [1,2], sadness can make hills
appear steeper [3], fearful faces may increase the ability to see
contrast [4], and heights may appear taller when afraid [5,6].
Emotions are typically described as having multiple components,
which include arousal/activation and motivation/valence [7–9].
In its simplest form, the motivation or valence component invokes
a goal to either approach (good) or withdraw from (bad) objects or
situations [8,10,11]. For instance, people will withdraw from a
dangerous snake and approach a cute cuddly baby. In contrast,
the arousal/activation component signals the level of activation of
the motivational system [12] and the consciously perceived
urgency of the situation [13]. Russell and Barrett [12] suggest
that arousal reflects changes in the sympathetic nervous system,
the autonomic nervous system, or the endocrine system. For
example, snakes may invoke a withdrawal motivation, but arousal
signals the immediacy of action, which can be dependent on the
type of snake. A King Cobra requires immediate withdrawal and
the activation of the physiological system, whereas a garden snake
may not. Within the context of height, people are often motivated
to avoid a height, but does arousal influence the urgency to
withdraw?
In the case of perception, increased arousal may alter
representations of the environment by the intensification of
feelings [e.g., of danger or anger, see 13, 14]. This intensification
could be taken into account when estimating the spatial layout of
an environment, especially in situations where visual cues
specifying layout (such as the horizon) may be ambiguous (e.g.,
when standing on a balcony or the top of a hill). If arousal biases
perceptual judgments of spatial layout, then this could also
contribute to both a feed-forward and feed-back loop, in which
increased arousal biases perceptual judgments, which then leads to
further arousal, and so on. We argued that such a mechanism
could have led to the height overestimation observed in our
previous work [6]. Across four experiments, we showed that
arousal induced by viewing height-relevant arousing pictures
increased estimates of a height that was viewed from above. These
findings suggest that arousal is a key component of emotion that is
utilized when estimating heights.
However, the motivated perception account suggests that
arousal does not influence the perceived proximity to objects
[see 15 for a review]. This account suggests that objects that invoke
desirability or threat require action resulting in changes in the
perceived proximity to those objects. In what may be a bit of an
over-simplification of their approach, a height that is deemed
threatening should be perceived differently than a height that is
deemed not threatening. In other words, if a 10 foot cliff is deemed
threatening, people should over-estimate the height irrespective of
their level of arousal. On the other hand, if the 10 foot cliff is
deemed non-threatening, then perception of the height should be
perceived accurately (or at least not overestimated as much).
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Indeed, research on motivated perception has consistently
found that arousal does not underlie effects of motivation on
perceptual judgments. For example, in one experiment, hungry
participants judged a slice of pizza to be closer than an empty cup
that was equidistant away from observers [16]. However, when the
motivation to eat decreased (i.e., after satiation) the same slice of
pizza was judged to be a similar distance away as the empty cup.
As suggested by Balcetis, the arousal elicited by the slice of pizza
should have been similar across the different motivation states, so
motivation, not arousal, best predicted distance estimates to the
pizza. Similar findings were obtained when the distance to an
object being estimated was threatening [2]. People were exposed
to a video in which a man performed either a threatening action or
a disgusting action, and participants’ heart rate variability, a
measure of arousal, was assessed while viewing the actions. The
man in the video was then brought into the lab and participants
estimated the distance to him to be shorter when the man
performed a threatening act compared to a disgusting act on the
video. Important to note is that this effect was maintained even
when arousal (measured through heart rate variability) was
statistically controlled for, which suggests that arousal was not
the agent of influence on perceptual estimates. Thus, arousal may
be constrained by influencing distances in which there is potential
for action (e.g., walking up a hill, falling off a cliff), but not
perceptual estimates for non-motivationally relevant situations
(e.g., seeing food when satiated, being at the base of a height) that
do not require or invoke action.
Given the potential discrepancy in the literature on the role of
arousal in perceptual judgments, we conducted a series of
experiments to pinpoint the boundaries of an effect exploring
when arousal and motivation are both manipulated, and when
arousal is manipulated but the motivation to withdraw from a
height is held constant. One implicit assumption we had, but never
formally tested, was that standing on top of a height induces a
motivation to withdraw to prevent injury. It remains unclear
whether the height produces a motivational goal to withdraw or
whether the experimentally induced arousal produces a motiva-
tional goal to withdraw. Thus, our first experiment in this paper
examined how motivational qualities of the environment influence
height estimates when people are aroused. In our second
experiment, we wanted to rule out a potential confound within
our induction method. The images used to induce arousal
contained height-related themes. Thus, the images, and not the
balcony itself, may have invoked a motivation to withdraw. The
last two experiments were designed to examine whether arousal
can moderate height estimates based on the intensity of the arousal
and whether height estimates are changed when arousal is
attributed to a source other than the height. Overall, we sought
to better identify when and how arousal influences estimates of
heights given the discrepancy in the literature about how arousal
contributes (or not) to effects of motivation on perceptual
judgments. Such an investigation is warranted because of recent
concerns about the generalizability and validity of effects of
emotion and motivation on perceptual judgments [17]. Deter-
mining whether these effects are limited or broad in scope will
increase our understanding of the ways in which arousal and
motivation are involved (or not) in everyday perceptual judgments.
Safety of Environment
In the first experiment, we examined whether arousal influences
judgments when initial appraisals of a height were either
dangerous or safe. Threatening environments lead to an increased
physiological response e.g., [18,19]. In previous work, we showed
that threatening environments (heights viewed from the top) were
overestimated, especially when the observer was also aroused [6].
However, it is unclear whether a height that is viewed as not
threatening (in other words, viewed from below) will also be
overestimated when aroused. Based on a motivation account,
environments perceived as threatening should elicit changes in
perceptual estimates (irrespective of arousal levels), whereas those
perceived as not threatening should fail to influence such estimates
[15,20]. Likewise, we also predict that the environment has to be
deemed threatening in order to influence height judgments.
However, contrary to the motivated perception approach, the
induced arousal should activate the motivational system and
increase the perceived sense of urgency resulting in a modulation
of the height estimate through arousal. Thus, we investigated
whether arousal influences height estimates only when a threat is
present, thereby testing for whether a general perceptual bias of
heights exists under conditions of arousal, or whether a motivation
to withdraw (e.g., brought on by a threat) is needed for arousal to
influence judgments.
Stimulus-Driven Cues of Danger
In our previous work, we found that arousing participants by
asking them to view images of height situations affected
subsequent height judgments. But as mentioned above, the images
themselves contained height-related themes (i.e., a skydiver, a man
falling from a building) introducing a potential confound. The
arousing images may have induced both a higher state of arousal
and a motivation to withdraw from heights. Prior research has
observed that motivations can be primed conceptually, which in
turn motivates behavior that is compatible with the prime [21]. It
is quite possible that the height estimates were influenced by a
cognitively induced motivation to avoid a height. Therefore, we
wanted to de-confound arousal and motivation to clarify the
component responsible for influencing height estimates.
Dissipation of arousal?
If arousal affects height estimates, then it should have more of
an effect when feelings of arousal are intense, rather than
diminished. Thus, the intensity of the arousal when making the
height estimate should lead to direct changes to height estimates,
irrespective of the cognitive meaning of the stimuli. This
prediction would be consistent with the idea that the height
triggers a motivation to withdraw, and the induced arousal signals
the urgency for withdrawal. Lower urgency should correspond to a
lower height estimate, whereas higher urgency should correspond
to a higher height estimate. However, if motivation to act (or step
away) at a height leads to height overestimation, then it should do
so regardless of the level of arousal. Prior research finds that more
intense levels of arousal have a greater influence on non-
perceptual judgments compared to less intense levels of arousal
[22]. Therefore, we sought to manipulate the intensity of the
arousal at the time of the judgment to assess whether the intensity
level influences height estimates.
Attribution of arousal?
For the theories that assume that feelings can transfer from one
source to another [13,23–24] there is an assumption that the
transferred feelings can be discounted when making a judgment.
For instance, Schwarz and Clore [25] found that well-being
judgments were influenced by the weather (e.g., sunny days
elicited higher well-being judgments), but those biased judgments
were reduced when attention was directed to the true source of the
participant’s feelings (i.e., the weather). This assumption is critical
for examining the ability of induced feelings (potentially feelings of
arousal) to influence judgments. If induced arousal is a cue of
Arousal and Perception
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urgency to avoid the height, then participants should be able to
discount the false sense of urgency. This discounting should then
have a direct effect on the judgment of the height. In other words,
by discounting feelings of arousal, urgency should be reduced,
thereby reducing the motivation to avoid the height and possibly
rendering it less dangerous. Therefore, when cues that intensify
the need to avoid the height are revealed to be false, can
participants correctly discount those feelings of urgency leading to
a reduced height overestimation?
Overview of Current Studies
We examine whether arousal influences height estimates when
the estimates are made from a threatening location (from above) or
a safe location (from below). We predict that arousal will only
influence height estimates from the top. Then, we investigate the
effects of situation and non-situation relevant arousal on height
estimates by altering the composition of the images used to arouse
participants. We predict that situation and non-situation relevant
arousal will have similar effects when estimating heights because
the motivation to withdraw is endemic to the height and arousal
serves to activate and intensify the present motivation. Next, we
test for effects of arousal intensity with non-situation relevant
arousal, by introducing an intermediate or a long delay between
the arousal manipulation and the perceptual judgment. We expect
the long, compared to intermediate, time delay to diminish the
level of arousal, which in turn would decrease the activation and
intensity of the motivation to withdraw. In the final experiment,
we test whether attribution of the arousal to its appropriate source
will diminish overestimations of height. We predict that when the
arousal is appropriately attributed to its true source (i.e., the
pictures) height estimates will be reduced compared to the non-
attribution condition.
Experiment 1
The first experiment examined if arousal influences height
estimates when the environment is dangerous vs. safe. Viewing a
height from above is a dangerous situation (i.e., falling), which
should elicit an appraisal of threat and a motivation to withdraw.
That cognitive appraisal may result in an assessment of current
physiological cues, and these cues, we believe, will influence
judgments of the height. However, viewing the height from below
is safe, so that should not elicit a motivation to withdraw. As a
result, feelings of arousal may not be used to make a judgment
about the height. Therefore, we predict that aroused individuals
who view a height from above will estimate the height as higher
compared to non-aroused individuals. Also, we predict that height
estimates will be similar for the aroused and non-aroused
conditions when a height is viewed from below.
Method
Ethics Statement. The Queens College – CUNY Institution
Review Board approved the study prior to the study being
conducted, and written, informed consent was obtained for every
participant.
Participants. Sixty-eight (45 female, 23 male) undergraduate
students from Queens College participated to fulfill a course
requirement. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Their mean age was 20.47 years (SD = 3.26).
Stimuli and Apparatus
Arousal Task. Participants saw the same pictures used in
Stefanucci and Storbeck [6]. The pictures were from International
Affective Picture System (IAPS) [26], and arousing pictures were
used because they reliably elicit emotional and physiological
arousal [18,27]. One-hundred and twenty images were selected
and divided into four groups of 30 pictures. Each participant saw
one set of pictures (A and B were arousing, C and D were non-
arousing). All sets contained both positive and negative images.
The arousing pictures contained a mixture of height relevant (e.g.,
looking down from a tall building, looking down from a mountain,
viewing skydivers in the air) and height irrelevant (e.g., a snarling
dog, a grizzly bear, an explosion, people with guns) themes (8
pictures were height related in each picture set). Pictures were
presented using PowerPoint Presentation. Summary information
concerning the slides and their ratings can be found in Stefanucci
and Storbeck [6].
Perceptual Task. Participants stood on or below a balcony
that measured 5 meters high, inside a building. The balcony
overlooked a hallway. A large yellow disk made of core board
(44 cm in diameter) marked the distance to be judged on the
ground beneath the balcony or extended from the top of the
railing of the balcony.
Arousal Manipulation Check. The manipulation check was
administered after the perceptual task. The participant was asked
to ‘‘describe how you felt while viewing the pictures.’’ They
answered this question using 6-point Likert scale with 1 being ‘‘not
aroused’’ and 6 being ‘‘very aroused.’’
Acrophobia Questionnaire. Participants completed the
Acrophobia Questionnaire (AQ) (Anxiety Subscale) [28] to
measure trait-level fear associated with heights. This scale
measures the degree to which a person has fear-relevant thoughts
when thinking about a variety of height environments.
Procedure. Participants were told that the purpose of the
experiment was to test their memory for the pictures. To provide a
break between the learning and testing phases of the memory task,
participants were asked to complete a filler task (judging the height
of a balcony). The perceptual task was described as being
completely separate from the memory task. Participants were
randomly assigned to either the arousing or non-arousing (neutral)
condition. The experimenter was unaware of participant condition
because dummy codes, known only to the first author, were used
for the conditions and the experimenter left the room before image
presentation began. This procedure was used in all subsequent
studies.
Participants were shown one set of 30 pictures, and all pictures
were presented for 3 seconds with a 250 ms delay between
pictures. Immediately following picture presentation, participants
left the laboratory and were walked to the balcony. The laboratory
was located on the third floor, and the participants were walked
down to the second floor (when estimating from above) or to the
first floor (when estimating from below). There was an additional
delay of approximately 12 seconds for the participants assigned to
the estimating from below condition due to walking down the
extra flight of stairs. Participants were randomly assigned to a
viewing position. The group that estimated from the top stood on
the edge of the two-story balcony (with a 0.90 m high railing) with
the target placed on the ground below the balcony. They
estimated the height of the balcony by positioning an experimenter
to be the same distance along the balcony as the top of the railing (to
control for eye-height differences) was to the target on the ground.
The group that estimated the height from below viewed the target
extended out 0.75 m from the top of the railing for the balcony.
They estimated the height of the balcony by positioning an
experimenter to be the same distance from the ground beneath their
feet to the target extended from the top of the balcony railing. For
both conditions, the experimenter walked backward while facing
the participant and waited for the participant to tell him or her to
Arousal and Perception
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stop. (The researchers were instructed to walk backwards at a slow
to medium pace, but were told to maintain the pace until the
participant instructed them to stop). Participants were encouraged
to look back to the target as often as they liked and to adjust the
experimenter to be closer or farther until they were satisfied with
their matched estimate. Allowing them to continuously view the
target during the matching task helped to ensure they were not
estimating the height from memory. After estimating the height,
participants then estimated the size of the target. This measure
served as an indirect index of perceived height given that the
perceived size of an object can be influenced by the perceived
distance to the object (known as the size-distance invariance
hypothesis) [29]. The experimenter stood approximately 0.61 m
from the participant, and held a tape measure with the marked
side facing the experimenter. The participant was informed to
estimate the size of the target by treating one end of the target as
one end of the tape measure and the other end of the target as the
other end of the tape measure. The experimenter then pulled the
tape measure out slowly until the participant believed that the
length of the tape measure matched the diameter of the target.
The participants were encouraged to adjust the length of the tape
measure as much as they wanted in order to be as accurate as
possible.
Participants were then brought back into the laboratory where
they completed the Arousal Manipulation Check, the Acrophobia
Questionnaire (AQ), and a demographic questionnaire. Finally,
participants were debriefed and were asked specific questions to
determine whether or not they linked the picture viewing to the
height task. None of the participants were aware of the connection
between the emotion induction and the height estimates.
Results
For all of the reported experiments, we assessed whether the
research assistant (RA) influenced height estimates by running a
multivariate ANOVA. RA was entered as an independent variable
along with the other manipulated variables specific to each
experiment and the dependent variables were height and size
estimates. All main effects involving RA and all interaction terms
were non-significant, all F’s,1.
Manipulation Check and Acrophobia Questionnaire.
We assessed whether the arousal induction was successful by
running a 2(Viewing Position: Top or Bottom) by 2(Arousal Level:
Aroused or Neutral) factorial ANOVA on participant’s self-
reported level of arousal while viewing the pictures. As expected,
the main effect for Arousal was significant, F(1, 63) = 27.38,
p,0.01, g2 = 0.30, in that the arousal condition experienced
higher levels of arousal during picture viewing compared to the
neutral condition. The main effect for Viewing Position, F(1,
63) = 1.88, p = 0.18, g2 = 0.03, and the interaction between
viewing position and arousal level, F,1, were non-significant.
See Table 1 for Manipulation Check means for all experiments.
To assess whether there were group differences in trait-level fear
associated with heights (AQ), we ran a 2(Viewing Position: Top or
Bottom)62(Arousal Level: Aroused or Neutral) factorial ANOVA
on the total trait-level fear score. No differences were observed for
self-reported trait fear of heights by condition, F,1.
Perceptual Estimates. To examine whether location of the
observer and arousal level affected height estimates, we ran a
2(Viewing Position: Top or Bottom) by 2(Arousal Level: Aroused
or Neutral) factorial ANCOVA with height estimates as the
dependent variable and AQ as the covariate. There were
significant main effects of Viewing Position, F(1, 62) = 24.41,
p,0.01, g2 = 0.28, and Arousal Level, F(1, 62) = 5.65, p = 0.02,
g2 = 0.08. The covariate, AQ, was not significant, F,1. Estimat-
ing the balcony from the top led to greater height estimates as
compared to estimates made when viewing the height from below,
replicating prior work on height overestimation and viewing
position [30–31]. Arousal level also affected overall estimation of
height such that exposure to the arousal images resulted in greater
height estimates when compared to viewing neutral images.
However, both of the main effects were qualified by the significant
interaction effect between Viewing Position and Arousal Level,
F(1, 62) = 7.46, p = 0.01, g2 = 0.11. The interaction revealed that
the high-arousal from above condition provided the tallest height
estimate when compared to the other three conditions (all
ps,0.01). We also observed that the neutral from top condition
provided a higher height estimate compared to the high-arousal
from bottom condition, t(32) = 2.17, p = 0.04. See Figure 1 for a
graphical representation of the means.
Size Estimates. Another 2(Viewing Position: Top or Bottom)
by 2(Arousal Level: Aroused or Neutral) factorial ANCOVA was
run to analyze the effects of viewing position and arousal level on
estimates of the size of the target situated at either the top or
bottom of the height with AQ serving as the covariate. In contrast
to the results obtained for height estimates, there was no main
effect of Viewing Position, F(1, 62) = 1.33, p = 0.25, g2 = 0.02,
Arousal Level, F(1, 62) = 2.17, p = 0.15, g2 = 0.03, or AQ, F,1, on
estimates of the size of the target. The interaction between
Viewing Position and Arousal Level, F,1, was non-significant.
See Table 2 for size estimates for all experiments.
Correlations between Height and Size
Estimates. Though size estimates did not vary based on our
manipulations, we did observe a significant positive correlation





Arousal, From Top 3.64 (0.84) 60.93 (21.52)
Non-Arousal, From Top 2.53 (1.30) 63.53 (16.91)
Arousal, From Bottom 4.26 (1.15) 59.95 (21.77)
Non-Arousal, From Bottom 2.63 (0.90) 64.11 (25.76)
Experiment 2
Arousal, Height-Relevant 4.00 (0.79) 55.53 (20.78)
Arousal, Height-Irrelevant 3.67 (1.14) 51.50 (11.90)
Neutral 2.65 (1.32) 52.12 (19.01)
Experiment 3
Arousal No Delay 3.48 (0.97) 56.71 (21.00)
Arousal Delay 3.75 (0.81) 62.19 (19.59)
Neutral No Delay 2.65 (1.19) 54.92 (22.17)
Neutral Delay 2.52 (0.93) 62.21 (16.73)
Experiment 4
Height-Relevant, Attribution 3.73 (1.49) 62.00 (25.16)
Height-Irrelevant, Attribution 3.27 (0.90) 51.64 (17.19)
Height-Relevant, No Attribution 4.00 (1.54) 53.75 (21.04)
Height-Irrelevant, No Attribution 3.55 (0.69) 59.27 (17.78)
Note. The table presents the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for
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between the height and size estimates, r(68) = 0.30, p = 0.01, such
that greater estimates of the height were associated with larger
estimates of target size. This correlation was mostly driven by
significant positive correlations observed between height and size
estimates when viewing from the top in either the arousal
condition, r(15) = 0.67, p = 0.01, or the neutral condition,
r(15) = 0.56, p = 0.03. When participants estimated the height
from below, there were no significant correlations between height
and size estimates in either the arousal condition, r(19) = 20.27,
p = 0.27, or the neutral condition, r(19) = 0.23, p = 0.34.
Discussion
The results of this experiment replicate those of Stefanucci and
Storbeck [6]. When participants viewed the height from above and
were aroused, they overestimated height. However, the current
study extended the previous findings by showing that participants
who viewed the height from below and were aroused did not
overestimate height as compared to a non-aroused group. The
results for viewing from below would be consistent with the notion
that when a motivational tendency to withdraw or threat of falling
is lacking, arousal fails to influence perceptual estimates [2,16].
Given we did not find differences in estimates of height from below
associated with arousal condition, we conclude that arousal may
only have an influence on height judgments when the environment
is appraised as threatening.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined whether viewing arousing
images that contained height relevant themes, as used in previous
experiments [6] (Exps. 1 & 2), primed danger or a motivation to
avoid heights. If the pictures primed danger, it is possible that they
resulted in a cognitive bias to estimate the height as taller or more
dangerous leading to an exaggerated judgment rather than a
change in actual perception of the height. If this is true, then
height judgments should only be influenced by height-relevant, but
not height-irrelevant arousal. In other words, we believe that the
arousal does not have to invoke a threat of heights to influence
height estimates. Rather, we suspect the height itself provides a
threatening motivation (as observed in Experiment 1), which
results in assessing internal arousal cues to estimate the height.
Therefore, we predict that both height-relevant and height-
irrelevant residual arousal should influence height estimates. This
prediction is based on findings in which residual arousal not
produced by the target of a judgment still influenced the judgment
of that target [22,24,32].
Method
Ethics Statement. The Queens College – CUNY Institution
Review Board approved the study prior to the study being
conducted, and written, informed consent was obtained for every
participant.
Participants. Fifty-three (31 female, 21 male, 1 unreported)
undergraduate students from Queens College participated in the
study for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Mean age was 21.52 years (SD = 5.78).
Stimuli and Apparatus. To find a set of pictures that were
arousing with height-relevant themes (e.g., skydivers, views from
tops of tall objects), we created a set of 80 pictures that included
some IAPS images (all resized to the standard format of the IAPS
pictures).The set of pictures that were arousing with height-
irrelevant themes (e.g., snakes, guns, explosions) and the neutral
(e.g., a desk, a fork, abstract art) images were obtained solely from
the IAPS. We asked 43 participants (who did not estimate height)
to evaluate the 80 height-related pictures on both arousal and
valence dimensions using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) [33]
scale, which was used by Lang and colleagues to obtain normative
ratings for all pictures contained in the IAPS [26]. The SAM scale
consists of measures assessing two independent dimensions (1)
arousal and (2) valence, each represented on a 9 point scale. For
Figure 1. Motivation of the height interacts with arousal to
moderate height estimates. Mean height estimates for the Arousal
by Height from top and bottom and Non-Arousal by Height from top
and bottom in Experiment 1. Bars represent one standard error of the
mean and the dotted horizontal line represents the actual height of the
balcony.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092024.g001
Table 2. Mean Size Estimates (cm) for each Experiment.
Conditions Size Estimate
Experiment 1
Arousal, From Top 43.16 (14.21)
Non-Arousal, From Top 37.25 (12.12)
Arousal, From Bottom 44.68 (10.36)
Non-Arousal, From Bottom 42.50 (9.09)
Experiment 2
Arousal, Height-Relevant 45.63 (13.30)
Arousal, Height-Irrelevant 43.73 (8.00)
Neutral 36.48 (11.80)
Experiment 3
Arousal No Delay 44.85 (5.56)
Arousal Delay 39.23 (8.95)
Neutral No Delay 41.53 (6.67)
Neutral Delay 40.17 (9.15)
Experiment 4
Height-Relevant, Attribution 44.88 (10.18)
Height-Irrelevant, Attribution 40.76 (10.54)
Height-Relevant, No Attribution 43.42 (11.51)
Height-Irrelevant, No Attribution 47.44 (13.59)
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the arousal scale, one endpoint has a manikin that is jittery and the
other end point has a manikin with a sleepy look. For the valence
scale, one endpoint has a manikin with a smiling expression and
on the other endpoint is a manikin with a frowning expression.
Participants were instructed to view each picture for 5 seconds and
then evaluate it on both dimensions of arousal and valence.
Participants were instructed to evaluate the picture by pressing the
numeric key that corresponded to the manikin that best
represented how they felt. Because we were most concerned with
arousal, the arousal SAM was always presented first, followed by
the valence SAM. A 1 second delay occurred between trials.
Based on the ratings provided, we selected 30 of the top rated
arousing pictures (e.g., individuals jumping from high heights,
views from the top of buildings, bridges, and mountains, etc). We
then compared the ratings for these images to the 30 pictures that
were height-irrelevant and arousing from the IAPS and the 30
pictures that were height-irrelevant and non-arousing (i.e., neutral
condition) from the IAPS. The three picture conditions were
subjected to a one-way ANOVA with arousal as the dependent
measure. As expected, the effect was significant, F(2, 89) = 170.00,
p,0.01, g2 = 0.80. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD revealed
that the two arousal picture sets did not differ, p = 0.99, but the
height-relevant set differed from the neutral set, p,0.01, and the
height-irrelevant set also differed from the neutral set, p,0.01.
Another one-way ANOVA was run to compare valence ratings by
condition. As expected, the main effect was significant, F(2,
89) = 4.64, p = 0.01, g2 = 0.10. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s
HSD revealed that the height-relevant set did not differ from the
height-irrelevant set, p = 0.95; however, the neutral set was rated
as more positive compared to both the height-relevant set,
p = 0.04, and the height-irrelevant set, p = 0.02. We were not
concerned that the neutral condition was rated as more positive
compared to the other two conditions given our previous work
found valence has little influence on the overestimation of height
when aroused [6].
Procedure. The same cover story was used as in Experiment
1, in that participants were told that the pictures were part of a
memory test and the height task served as a filler task. Participants
were randomly assigned to condition. All participants viewed the
height from above and estimated height as in Experiment 1.
Results
Manipulation Check and Acrophobia Questionnaire.
We first assessed participants self-reported level of arousal
experienced while viewing the pictures (one individual failed to
provide an arousing rating, but he/she was kept for height and size
analyses). We ran a one-way ANOVA to evaluate self-reported
level of arousal by condition, and the effect of condition was
significant, F(2, 49) = 6.93, p,0.01, g2 = 0.22. Post-hoc analyses
confirmed that the two arousal conditions (height-relevant and
height-irrelevant) were not different in levels of arousal experience,
p = 0.38. However, the arousal, height-relevant condition reported
higher levels of arousal compared to the neutral condition,
p,0.01, and the arousal, height-irrelevant condition also reported
higher levels of arousal compared to the neutral condition,
p = 0.09, although it was only marginally significant.
A one-way ANOVA was run to evaluate whether there were
mean differences in trait-level fear associated with heights (AQ)
among the conditions, and the condition main effect was non-
significant, F,1. Therefore, no differences were observed among
the conditions in trait-level fear associated with heights.
Perceptual Estimates. To examine whether height-
irrelevant arousal moderates the height overestimation effect, a
one-way ANCOVA was run with AQ as the covariate. As
expected, a significant main effect of condition was observed, F(2,
48) = 4.60, p = 0.02, g2 = 0.16. The main effect for AQ was not
significant, F,1. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD found that
the height-relevant condition made similar height estimates to the
height-irrelevant condition, p = 0.98. However, both the height-
relevant, p = 0.02, and the height-irrelevant, p = 0.03, conditions
gave significantly taller estimates of the balcony compared to the
neutral condition (see Figure 2).
Size Estimates. To examine whether height-irrelevant
arousal moderated estimates of the size of the target, we ran a
one-way ANCOVA with AQ as the covariate. A significant main
effect of condition was observed, F(2, 48) = 3.70, p = 0.03,
g2 = 0.13. The main effect for AQ was not significant, F,1.
Post-hoc analyses revealed that the height-relevant and the height-
irrelevant did not differ with respect to their size estimates,
p = 0.43. However, the neutral condition provided smaller size
estimates compared to both the height-relevant, p = 0.01, and the
height-irrelevant, p = 0.05, conditions.
Correlations between Height and Size Estimates. We
assessed whether there was a relationship between the height and
size estimates across conditions. Overall, we observed a significant
positive correlation between height and size estimates, r(53) = 0.54,
p,0.01, such that greater estimates of height corresponded to
larger target estimates. More specifically, we found that the height-
relevant condition showed this positive correlation, r(18) = 0.63,
p,0.01, but both the height-irrelevant, r(18) = 0.35, p = 0.16, and
the neutral, r(17) = 0.27, p = 0.29, conditions did not.
Discussion
We found that arousal, regardless of its relevance to heights, was
sufficient to produce an overestimation of height compared to the
neutral condition. Moreover, we observed the same pattern of
results for the size estimate. This finding suggests that the
motivational relevance (i.e., height-related, arousing images) of
the induction does not impact how the height is estimated. Rather,
the presence or absence of an induced arousal state was the best
predictor of height estimates. Moreover, in our prior work [6] we
observed that when the images were positive and approach-
Figure 2. Arousal, but not motivation relevance, of the
induction moderates height estimates. Mean height estimates
for the height-relevant, height-irrelevant, and control conditions in
Experiment 2. Bars represent one standard error of the mean and the
dotted horizontal line represents the actual height of the balcony.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092024.g002
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oriented they had the same influence on height estimates as
negative and withdrawal-oriented images. In sum, we suggest that
estimating a height from above is threatening, and that arousal
cues irrespective of the theme or motivational quality serve to
increase height and size estimates.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was designed to examine whether the intensity of
arousal also contributes to height overestimation, while holding
the motivational quality of the stimuli constant (e.g., always
threatening). If the arousal from the pictures is combined with
arousal produced by the target, then the intensity of the induced
arousal should moderate height estimates. In a previous study, we
found that participants who were asked to up-regulate their
emotional experience when viewing arousing pictures increased
their height estimates compared to participants who simply viewed
arousing images [6]. In the current study, we examine whether
reducing the intensity of the arousal once it is present can
eliminate the height overestimation observed after viewing
arousing pictures. If we demonstrate that overestimation of height
is dependent on the intensity of arousal, then this would provide
strong evidence that arousal is contributing to height estimations
and would also allow us to understand the time course of such an
effect.
In order to manipulate the intensity of the arousal, we adopted a
timing paradigm from Cantor et al. [22]. They induced arousal
and participants judged erotic films immediately after viewing or
after an intermediate or a long delay. Only the intermediate delay
influenced judgments of erotic films. The immediate delay failed to
influence judgments because participants were aware of the true
source of their feelings, whereas, the long delay failed to influence
judgments because the arousal wore off. Research by Cantor et al.
[22] revealed that a nine-minute delay was sufficient to return
physiological markers of arousal back to a baseline state, whereas
within the intermediate condition (5 minutes post induction)
arousal was still elevated from baseline. We predict that with an
intermediate delay both height-relevant and -irrelevant arousal
conditions will show increased height estimates, but after a long
delay both height-relevant and -irrelevant arousal conditions will
estimate height as the neutral condition would.
We manipulated timing by having participants in the interme-
diate delay condition estimate height following the arousal
induction, whereas participants in the long delay condition
completed a Big Five personality inventory between the arousal
induction and the height estimate. The Big Five personality task
was selected because none of the questions relate to height or to
arousal. To ensure that completing the Big Five personality
measure alone did not influence height we included a neutral
condition in which participants viewed neutral pictures then
completed the Big Five measure prior to estimating the height. As
mentioned previously, Cantor et al. [22] found that a long delay
(9 minutes) between arousal induction and judgment did not
influence the judgments. However, the intermediate delay of
5 minutes between arousal and evaluation increased the evalua-
tion of the erotic film. For our experiment, the induction takes
place in the lab and the participants have to walk to the balcony,
so there is a delay of 3–5 minutes (i.e., walk+instruction) when no
additional time is added. Therefore, we ran a ,5 minute delay
(time between induction and estimates in previous experiments)
and a ,9 minute delay condition (the Big Five personality
questionnaire takes about 4–5 minutes to complete).
Method
Ethics Statement. The Queens College – CUNY Institution
Review Board approved the study prior to the study being
conducted, and written, informed consent was obtained for every
participant.
Participants. Ninety (59 female, 27 male, 4 non-reported)
undergraduate students from Queens College participated in the
study for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Mean age was 20.93 years (SD = 4.43).
Stimuli, Apparatus, and Procedure. The two arousing
conditions viewed 30 height-irrelevant, arousing pictures and the
neutral conditions viewed 30 height-irrelevant, neutral pictures.
The procedures were identical to the procedures in Experiment 1,
except that the long delay condition completed the Big Five
Inventory, which had 44 items, immediately after viewing the
pictures. Once they completed the inventory they were walked to
the balcony to estimate the height.
Results
Manipulation Check and Acrophobia Questionnaire. A
262 (Arousal [arousal, neutral] x Delay [intermediate delay, long
delay]) factorial ANOVA was run to evaluate whether self-
reported level of arousal were influenced by the arousal and delay
manipulations. The effect of arousal was significant, F(1,
81) = 23.10, p,0.01, g2 = 0.22. The arousal condition reported
higher levels of arousal compared to the neutral condition. The
main effect for delay, F,1, and the interaction effect, F(1,
81) = 1.24, p = 0.27, g2 = 0.02, were both non-significant.
The same 262 factorial ANOVA was run to evaluate whether
arousal and delay interacted to influence trait-level fear of heights
(AQ). The two main effects of arousal, F,1, and delay, F(1,
81) = 2.13, p = 0.15, g2 = 0.03, and the interaction of arousal and
delay, F,1, were all found to be non-significant. Therefore, no
differences were observed among the conditions in trait-level fear
associated with heights.
Perceptual Estimates. First, to assess whether completion of
the Big Five personality questionnaire influenced height estimates,
we ran a 2(Arousal)62(Delay) factorial ANCOVA with the
personality items as covariates, and none of the factors achieved
a level of significance, all p’s.0.12. Thus, we removed the Big Five
Inventory from the analysis, because it had no influence on height
estimates.
A 262 (Arousal [arousal, neutral]6Delay [intermediate delay,
long delay]) factorial ANCOVA was run to evaluate whether a
delay between the arousal induction and the estimation task
influenced height estimates (AQ served as the covariate). We
observed a significant effect for Arousal, F(1, 81) = 7.06, p = 0.01,
g2 = 0.12; however, this main effect was qualified by the predicted
Arousal by Delay interaction, F(1, 81) = 9.46, p,0.01, g2 = 0.11.
The main effect for Delay was not significant, F,1. We also
observed a significant effect of the covariate AQ, F(1, 81) = 10.93,
p,0.01, g2 = 0.12. By examining the interaction shown in
Figure 3, as predicted, the intermediate arousal condition provided
the highest height estimates compared to the other three
conditions (all ps,0.05).
Size Estimates. Another 262 (Arousal6Delay) factorial
ANCOVA was run to determine whether a delay between the
arousal induction and the estimation tasks influenced size estimates
of the target (AQ served as the covariate). A trend was observed
for Delay, F(1, 81) = 2.70, p = 0.10, g2 = 0.03, such that the
intermediate delay condition had larger size estimates. However,
the main effect for Arousal, F,1, and AQ, F(1, 81) = 2.16,
p = 0.15, g2 = 0.03, and the Arousal by Delay interaction, F(1,
81) = 1.93, p = 0.17, g2 = 0.02 were all non-significant.
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Correlations between Height and Size Estimates. We
also assessed the correlation between the height and size estimates.
When all conditions were assessed, there was a positive correlation
between height and size estimates, r(89) = 0.55, p,0.01, such that
greater estimates of height corresponded to larger estimates of
target size. This significant positive correlation was present for the
Arousal, Long Delay, r(21) = 0.48, p = 0.03, the Arousal, Interme-
diate Delay, r(22) = 0.56, p = 0.01, and the Neutral, Intermediate
Delay, r(23) = 0.77, p,0.01, conditions. For the Neutral, Long
Delay condition, there was a trend toward a positive correlation,
r(23) = 0.38, p = 0.07.
Discussion
Experiment 3 demonstrated that when arousal dissipates, an
overestimation of height compared to the neutral condition does
not occur. In addition, when arousal has not dissipated,
overestimation of height compared to the long delay and neutral
conditions does occur, replicating the findings of the previous
experiments. Taken together, these results suggest that arousal
may serve as an urgency cue for how threatening a height is
estimated to be. When arousal cues are present, even when from
an unrelated source, it may elicit a greater sense of urgency to
withdraw from the height, which results in a higher overestima-
tion.
Experiment 4
We assume that feelings of arousal, activated when viewing the
images in the previous experiments, are attributed to the height
resulting in an overestimation [6,13]. Thus, increases in overes-
timation of height may be dependent upon the ability of the
arousal from an alternate source to be misinterpreted as stemming
from the height. We do note that in our prior research almost all
participants failed to realize the connection between the arousal
induction and the height estimate [6]. However, we have yet to
experimentally test whether arousal from the pictures is being
attributed to the balcony height (i.e., a dangerous environment).
Moreover, if people can become aware of how the irrelevant
source is influencing their feelings while on the balcony, can those
feelings be adjusted for in order to make a less biased estimate of
the height?
Prior research has tested attribution by drawing attention to the
true source of the emotional feelings. When participants attribute
their feelings to the irrelevant source, subsequent judgments are
adjusted to discount the emotional feelings from that source
[22,25,34]. In this experiment, we examine whether perceptual
estimates are moderated when the true source of the feelings are
made salient, to test whether height overestimations may result, in
part, from a misattribution of arousal. We hypothesized that when
participants attribute their feelings to the arousal manipulation
(i.e., the pictures), their perceptual estimates will be reduced
because arousal will no longer be used as information for the
height judgment.
Method
Ethics Statement. The Queens College – CUNY Institution
Review Board approved the study prior to the study being
conducted, and written, informed consent was obtained for every
participant.
Participants. Forty-five (23 female, 22 male) undergraduate
students from Queens College participated to fulfill a course
requirement. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Mean age was 21.13 years (SD = 5.38).
Stimuli and Apparatus. The stimuli and materials were
identical to those in Experiment 2, with the exception of the
attribution questions. In the attribution condition, participants
were asked three questions designed to draw attention to the
feelings of arousal elicited by the pictures (see Appendix S1) [35].
For the non-attribution condition, the participants viewed the
arousing images and provided estimates of the height.
Procedure. Four conditions were run in total: a height-
relevant arousing attribution condition, a height-irrelevant arous-
ing attribution condition, and both arousing conditions without
attribution manipulations. The procedure was identical to
Experiment 2, except that participants assigned to the attribution
conditions were asked three questions to draw attention to the
arousing nature of the pictures. The questions were asked
immediately after viewing the pictures while still in the lab, and
then participants walked to the balcony to complete the height
estimation task.
Results
Manipulation Check and Acrophobia
Questionnaire. Given that the attribution manipulation was
designed to make participants aware of the source of the arousal
feelings, we anticipated that all conditions should experience a
similar level of arousal when viewing the pictures. To assess self-
reported arousal, we ran a 2 Arousal Type (height-relevant vs.
height-irrelevant)62 Attribution (attribution vs. no attribution)
between-participants ANOVA. No significant main effect for
Arousal Type, F(1, 41) = 1.56, p = 0.22, g2 = 0.04, nor Attribution,
F,1, was observed, and there was no significant interaction
between Arousal Type and Attribution, F,1. Thus, all four
conditions experienced a similar level of arousal while viewing the
pictures.
To assess whether there were group differences in self-reported
trait-level fear associated with heights (AQ), we ran a 2 Arousal
Type62 Attribution between-participants ANOVA on mean trait-
level fear of heights. The main effects for Arousal Type, F,1, and
Attribution, F,1, were both non-significant. The interaction of
Arousal Type and Attribution was also non-significant, F(1,
Figure 3. Intensity of the arousal moderates height estimates.
Mean height estimates for the arousal intermediate delay, arousal long
delay, and neutral delay conditions in Experiment 3. Bars represent one
standard error of the mean and the dotted horizontal line represents
the actual height of the balcony.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092024.g003
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41) = 1.68, p = 0.20, g2 = 0.04. Therefore, there were no group
differences for self-reported, trait-level fear of heights.
Perceptual Estimates. To determine whether attributions
made about arousing pictures would influence height estimates, we
ran a 2 Arousal Type (height-relevant vs. -irrelevant pictures)62
Attribution (attribution vs. no attribution) between-participants
ANCOVA with height estimates as the dependent variable and
AQ as the covariate. As expected, we observed a significant main
effect for Attribution, F(1, 40) = 5.46, p,0.03, g2 = 0.12, but there
was no main effect of Arousal Type, F,1, and AQ, F,1, nor an
interaction between Arousal Type and Attribution, F,1 (See
Figure 4). The main effect of Attribution revealed that the non-
attribution conditions estimated the height to be taller than the
attribution conditions.
Size Estimates. The same 2(Arousal Type) by 2(Attribution)
between-participants ANCOVA used to analyze height estimates
was re-run with size estimates as the dependent measure and AQ
as the covariate. The main effects for Arousal, F,1, Attribution,
F,1, and AQ, F(1, 40) = 5.46, p = 0.11, g2 = 0.07, and the Arousal
by Attribution interaction, F = 1, were all non-significant.
Correlations between Height and Size Estimates. We
assessed the correlation between height estimates and size
estimates and found a significant positive correlation,
r(45) = 0.33, p = 0.03, such that greater height estimates corre-
sponded to larger estimates of target size. Given that each group
had fewer than fourteen people, we collapsed across the
Attribution conditions to examine correlations between height
and size estimates. The positive correlation remained significant
for both the Attribution, r(22) = 0.44, p = 0.04, and the no
Attribution, r(23) = 0.43, p = 0.04, conditions.
Discussion
When arousal was appropriately attributed to the images,
participants’ judgments of the height were reduced. This finding
suggests that feelings of arousal produced by an irrelevant source
can be used as cues when judging heights, but may not always be.
When the source of the arousal is correctly attributed to the
arousal induction, participants are able to discount those feelings
as information for height estimates. Also, when the feelings were
discounted, we believe that motivation to avoid the height may
have still been present, but less urgent, which translated into a
reduction in overestimation of the height.
General Discussion
These experiments explored how the presence and intensity of
arousal interacted with motivation to influence how people judge
the extent of a height. We observed that arousal influences
estimates of height when the height is viewed from the top, but not
from below, suggesting that an appraisal of danger is necessary for
arousal to serve as information when making judgments of height.
This result also suggests that when motivation to withdraw is not
as high (because one is standing on the ground) overestimation
may dissipate. Moreover, we found that viewing either height-
relevant or -irrelevant arousing pictures produced height overes-
timation. This suggests that arousal does not have to be specific to
the situation in order to influence perceptual judgments. However,
increasing the delay between the arousal manipulation and the
height estimate resulted in a reduction in height overestimation,
suggesting that the intensity of arousal needs to be sufficient for
overestimation to occur. Finally, we found that by directing
attention to the feelings elicited by the arousal manipulation,
participants discounted those feelings from the pictures when
making a height judgment, again resulting in decreased overes-
timations of height. The reduction of height overestimation
through a correct attribution of the source of the arousal, suggests
that arousal is being misattributed to influence judgments.
Our work involved making perceptual judgments, which adds to
the previous literature claiming that non-specific sources of arousal
influence cognitive judgments. For example, prior work found that
exercise induced arousal was misattributed to an erotic film and
influenced judgments of excitement about the film [22]. Research
examining long-term memory has also found that non-specific
sources of arousal enhance memory consolidation. For instance,
arousal inductions using a cold pressor task [36] or a Trier social
stressor task [37] both resulted in enhanced long-term memory of
emotional stimuli. Our results are also theoretically consistent with
the theory of excitation transfer proposed by Zillmann [24], which
argued that non-specific cues of arousal can be transferred from
one source to another to influence behavior. Adding to this
literature, we found that even height estimates are subject to the
influence of non-specific arousal cues when the extent is appraised
as dangerous.
Although feelings of arousal from multiple sources can influence
perceptual and cognitive judgments, the timing of that influence is
important. There exists a critical period in which the irrelevant
source of arousal and the target source of arousal need to co-occur.
A long delay between the arousal induction and the judgment can
lead to a dissipation of aroused feelings, thereby reducing or
nullifying the effect of residual arousal on judgments. For example,
Dutton and Aaron [38] had male participants walk over a rickety
bridge and either immediately talk with an attractive female
experimenter or the participants ‘‘walked off’’ the arousal feelings
elicited when crossing the rickety bridge and then they spoke with
the female experimenter. The participants who did not ‘‘walk-off’’
the arousal were more likely to attribute the aroused feelings to the
experimenter resulting in more participants phoning her later.
Our findings similarly suggest that concurrent or recent feelings of
residual arousal will be most likely to influence perceptual
judgments.
In addition to the dissipation of feelings due to a delay before
making a judgment, feelings that have been attributed to their true
Figure 4. Attribution of arousal reduces height estimates. Mean
height estimates for the attribution and non-attribution conditions
(collapsed across image themes) in Experiment 4. Bars represent one
standard error of the mean and the dotted horizontal line represents
the actual height of the balcony.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092024.g004
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source fail to influence height judgments. These results are
consistent with the arousal-as-information approach [13], see also
[24,39] for a similar theoretical view. The main tenet of the
affective arousal-as-information approach is that embodied cues of
valence and arousal provide signals of value (e.g., good, bad) and
importance, respectively. However, when the feelings are appro-
priately attributed to their true source, effects of emotion on
judgments are either nullified or in some cases reversed when
compared to non-attribution conditions [23,34]. Similar findings
were observed in the current experiment. When individuals were
able to correctly attribute the source of the arousal cues to the
arousal induction, those feelings were not used as information
about the height judgment. Rather those feelings were discounted
at the time of judgment, and consequently, height estimates were
lower than estimates provided by individuals in the non-attribution
conditions.
How does arousal influence perception?
Within our current studies, we also observed that even when
there was potential for motivated action (withdrawal), arousal
could weakly or strongly intensify the height overestimation effect.
In other words, once a situation is deemed dangerous and
produces arousal, a withdrawal motivation may result that
intensifies the feelings of urgency to act. However, it is unclear
whether there is a direct link between arousal and changes in
perception. One possibility is that arousal serves to narrow
attention. There is consistent evidence suggesting such an effect
exists [40–42]. However, the narrowing of attention could focus
the participant on internal, embodied cues, or external, perceptual
cues in the environment, or both. That is, if the event is appraised
as threatening, it should increase physiological arousal. Indeed,
prior research often finds that emotional stimuli become more
conscious and the foci of attention during the appraisal process
[43,44]. Thus, attention may shine a spotlight on the embodied
cues intensifying the feelings of danger, leading to an overestima-
tion of height in our experiments.
In contrast, arousal may also narrow attention toward the
perceptual environment. The arousal biased competition theory
has proposed that arousal will increase attention to the most salient
cue and reduce processing of non-salient cues [45]. Research by
Gable and Harmon-Jones [7] also finds that when people are in
approach or withdrawal states, increases in intensity of the
motivational state serve to narrow visual attention. When
estimating height, multiple cues are available and used to estimate
those extents. A narrowing of attention to one aspect of the
environment (i.e., how tall the railing is for safety purposes) could
reduce the number of perceptual cues available to judge the
extent, thereby fostering a greater reliance on non-visual cues such
as arousal. Future studies could experimentally test these ideas by
manipulating the availability of visual cues within the environ-
ment, possibly using virtual reality, such that the available visual
cues could specifically aid or worsen height judgments. The
reliance on arousal could then be better assessed in perceptual
environments with many and few visual cues.
Does arousal influence perception or judgments?
To understand observers’ perception of the environment, we
must ask them about what they see. Thus, both a perceptual
representation of the environment (in this case, a height) and a
decision process are required in order to form an estimate of the
environment. These decision processes could be influenced by
arousal, or the perceptual representation itself could be altered. If
arousal acts on the perceptual representation itself, then we could
argue that participants are seeing the height as taller when they are
aroused. Alternatively, arousal could act on the decision processes,
which are required to construct a response resulting in an effect on
judgments that are made after evaluation of the representation has
occurred. The behavioral data collected in these experiments does
not allow us to definitively claim that perception of the height was
altered by arousal, but we are sure that arousal influenced either
the representation or the decision process given our reliable and
consistent effects. We used two estimates of heights, a perceptual
matching task and a size estimate of the target. From a
participant’s perspective, the matching task is more susceptible
to cognitive bias than the size estimates because it is more difficult
to discern how to bias size estimates to be consistent with the
hypothesis that arousal should influence height (i.e., if one believes
they should say the height is taller, then size-distance invariance
states they should also say the target is larger [29]). Therefore, we
might suspect that the size estimates would be less susceptible to
cognitive biases. When examining the size estimates, we observed
mixed results. For Experiments 1 and 4, we failed to find
differences with respect to size estimates. For Experiments 2 and 3,
we observed differences in size estimates that mimicked the
findings of the matching task. The reason for these mixed patterns
of results remains unclear, as there could be several possibilities for
the differences. Also, there may be factors that moderate or
mediate whether height estimates are driven by changes in
perception or cognition. However, other work has shown that
spatial perception and contrast sensitivity may be affected by
arousal [4,14,46]. In conjunction with our findings, the literature
suggests that the effect of arousal on perception (whether it is the
representation or the decision process) generalizes across stimuli in
different domains of perceptual study.
Was arousal manipulated?
One limitation of this research was our inability to associate
experienced arousal with height estimates. We did not do this
because of the design of the experiment. Arousal was assessed after
the height judgment, which introduces a time delay between
viewing the pictures and completing the manipulation check
reducing the reliability of the manipulation check ratings.
Although there seems to be a simple remedy to fix this issue –
assessing feelings of arousal after viewing the pictures – this design
has its limitations as well. As evident in Experiment 4, observers’
height estimates were influenced when they correctly attributed
their residual arousal to the induction. So, assessing feelings of
arousal earlier could contaminate height judgments. Future
research could assess manipulated levels of arousal and their
influence on height estimates with physiological measurements
related to heart-rate variability and galvanic skin response (GSR).
However, we do note that obtaining physiological correlates of
arousal is tenuous and often not reliable.
What is the role of motivation?
In our set of experiments, we must consider that there were two
situations in which motivation and arousal were present; 1) the
induction, and 2) the height. For the induction, the current
findings and the findings presented in Stefanucci and Storbeck [6]
suggest that the motivation and/or valence of the induction does
not impact height estimates to the degree that arousal does. Across
the studies presented here, as well as those in Stefanucci and
Storbeck [6], images were manipulated to be exciting (approach-
oriented), fearful (avoidance-oriented), height-relevant (avoidance
of heights) or height-irrelevant (non-specific avoidance-orienta-
tion). The motivation orientation of the images did not have an
influence on perception to a greater degree than the level of
arousal. As for the height, we did observe that a motivation to
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withdraw (looking down vs. looking up) is necessary to produce an
overestimation effect. However, level of arousal still moderated the
extent of the overestimation, with high levels of arousal increasing
the overestimation compared to low levels of arousal. Thus, we
suggest that motivation is directly relevant to the situation being
judged, and that the motivation-orientation of the arousal
induction does not influence the perceptual estimate.
The motivated perception approach suggests that motivation
may change the perception of distances [15]. Specifically, objects
that are desirable (approachable) or threatening (avoidable) are
perceived to be closer in proximity than non-desirable or non-
threatening objects. Moreover, the approach also suggests that
arousal does not underlie these changes in perceived proximity.
With respect to our findings, we do suggest that the location of the
judgment does need to be threatening to elicit changes in
perception (see Exp. 1), which would be consistent with the
motivated perception approach. However, our results argue
against the direction of change in proximity (we find threatening
heights are perceived as farther rather than closer) and suggest a
role for arousal in perception. Namely, when heights are to be
avoided, people tend to overestimate the height. And this holds
true for people not induced into an aroused state [31], for those
who have a fear of heights [47–48], and for people induced into an
aroused state prior to estimating the height [6]. But, the degree of
the overestimation does appear, in part, to be dependent on the
level of arousal, with higher states of arousal leading to higher
overestimations of the height. In sum, the findings related to
arousal influencing height estimates as just described somewhat
contradict the motivated perception approach in that a motivation
to avoid a height makes the extent look taller, not shorter, and that
arousal moderates perceptual estimates of the extent.
Conclusions
Our results suggest that arousal may increase perceptual
estimates by serving as an intensifier of the already present
motivation to avoid a height (see also [5]). As observed, these
arousal cues can be quite general, the cues need to be intense at
the time of judgment, and the cues can be easily misattributed
from an irrelevant source to the height. However, in order for the
misattributed arousal to influence height judgments, the height has
to be potentially dangerous. These results support previous
theories suggesting that arousal can bias judgments [13,24,39]
and also extend these findings to include perceptual judgments. In
sum, the ability to transfer non-specific arousal to perceptual
judgments is adaptive in that it reduces the likelihood of
approaching a dangerous environment given the presence of
arousal.
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